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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Security as an Emergent Property of a 
Complex Adaptive System
Manu Lekunze
Security in Africa continues to be problematic to both scholars and practitioners. 
Its study often takes an itemised approach where actors are studied in detail and 
security outcomes are linked to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of actors. 
Perceived and actual security threats are correlated to conflict or presented as 
causal factors of conflict. In other words, security provision is explained through 
an itemised and reductionist analysis of security actors. In the past few decades, 
it is increasingly evident that non-linearity is pervasive in all forms of social 
organisation. This article rejects the Newtonian paradigm. It is argued that secu-
rity is often a product of a system, which can be a complex adaptive system (CAS). 
It contends that a resilient security system guarantees a minimum level of secu-
rity. To support this argument, empirical evidence from Cameroon is used to prove 
that Cameroon’s security system is a CAS. The conceptualisation of Cameroon’s 
security system as a CAS enables the application of both complexity science and 
resilience perspectives to security analysis. These perspectives allow the argument 
that Cameroon’s security system is resilient. The characterisation of Cameroon as 
fragile, failing or failed is rejected.
Introduction
African security literature can be classified 
into four broad categories. The first category 
is the traditionalist approach, which exam-
ines security from the state perspective. 
Consequently, the analysis focuses on what 
happens or does not happen to the state (the 
actions or inactions of the state) (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2012; Bell and Hindmoor 
2009; Börzel and Risse 2010; Clapham 2001). 
The second category is literature, which 
considers and analyses the role of actors 
(state and non-state). In some cases, it takes 
an itemised analysis of such actors (Baker 
2008; Baker 2010; Francis 2005; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002; International Crisis Group 
[ICG] 2010; (Goodfellow and Lindemann 
2013; Bevir 2013). The third category concep-
tualises security governance as a network of 
state and non-state actors (Baker 2010, Baker 
2008, Shearing and Johnston 2010). The 
final category argues that security provision 
takes a hybrid form (constant negotiation 
and renegotiation between formal and infor-
mal actors) (Mallett 2010; Boege et al. 2008).
In general, existing analysis of Cameroon’s 
security itemises threats and correlates 
them to the apparent mediocrity of certain 
security actors, then concludes by discuss-
ing Cameroon’s vulnerabilities. Such analy-
sis characterises Cameroon as a weak state, 
a fragile state, or a failing or failed state. 
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Indeed, one such study by the ICG is titled 
“Cameroun: mieux vaut prévenir que guérir” 
(prevention is better than cure) (ICG 2014) 
and another is titled “Cameroon: a fragile 
state” (ICG 2010). These analyses assume 
that Cameroon is about to fail, and that 
some policies with expected linear results 
must be implemented.
Most studies (Abrahamsen and Williams 
2009; Boege et al. 2008; Cummins 2013; 
Mallett 2010; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 
2015; Meagher 2012; Baker 2008; Baker 
2010; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Francis 
2005; ICG 2010; ICG 2014), regardless of 
the broad categories above, tend to take an 
additive or reductionist and linear approach 
— analysing security as the aggregate prod-
uct of the actions of individual security 
actors. Alternatively, some studies reduce 
security outcomes to the actions of indi-
vidual actors. Invariably, they draw linear 
cause-and-effect conclusions. It has become 
increasingly clear that in the Anthropocene 
(Grove and Chandler 2017), this Newtonian 
paradigm (the view of the world as a set of 
isolated objects that interact in a linear cause-
and-effect fashion), no longer sufficiently 
accounts for the complexity seen in the world 
today (Chandler 2014a; Mitchell 2009: ix).
An itemised analysis of the effects of secu-
rity threats to a state can be compared to an 
itemised analysis of the effects of pathogens 
on humans without regard for the power 
of the immune system. Depending on the 
state of the immune system, the flu virus 
(for example), affects various individuals dif-
ferently. The research on making humans 
resilient to the flu focuses on either a vac-
cine, which helps the immune system pre-
vent infection, or treatment, which helps 
the immune system cope with infection. It is 
the understanding of the virus in combina-
tion with the power of the immune system 
that helps scientists to invent medication 
that provides resilience and, consequently, 
health for the individual. The author sees no 
reason why security threats and security sys-
tems should be treated any differently from 
pathogens and the immune system. Just as 
a human has an immune system to defend 
against pathogens, the state has a security 
system to defend against security threats.
African literature (like that presented 
above) is useful in giving anthropological 
background to concepts such as security and 
the actors involved in security. However, it is 
argued that those studies are necessary but 
not sufficient. Instead, it is submitted that 
security is an emergent property of some-
thing else. While traditional anthropological, 
criminological and sociological studies may 
describe security conditions, it is argued that 
it is impossible for them to analyse security. 
The analysis of complex emergence is the 
reserve of complexity science and its tools, 
such as computational modelling.
This article contends that security can only 
be understood through the holistic study of 
security systems in conjunction with the spe-
cific threats that attack these systems within 
a specific context. In this context, threats 
(perturbations) are considered as inevitable; 
while some can be eliminated, the system 
evolves coping methods for most instead 
(Mazzar 2014). The essence of research 
becomes the understanding of threats and 
the ability of the security system to invent 
the vaccines and medication (resilience poli-
cies) necessary to enhance resilience. The 
research in this article, therefore, turns to 
complexity science and complex adaptive 
systems to enhance the study of security.
Complexity theory argues that there 
exists a special type of system called “com-
plex  adaptive systems” (Hudson 2000; 
Homer-Dixon 2001; Eidelson 1997). Key char-
acteristics of these complex adaptive systems 
can be extracted from complexity science 
literature. These characteristics are related to 
the composition and the behaviour of a CAS. 
The characteristics include: multiplicity of 
agents that are heterogeneous, autonomous 
and interact in a network through specified 
protocols (Schneider and Johannes 2007: 
25); agents are organised in a hierarchical 
structure; and complex systems contain mul-
tiple subsystems. The behaviour of complex 
systems is characterised by emergence, non-
linearity and non-reductionism (Urry 2006, 
Eidelson 1997). A CAS is self-organising, and 
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perturbations within these systems often 
express cascading behaviour (Holland 1995; 
Duit and Galaz 2008).
Some have argued that resilience think-
ing, and practice, is born out of the change 
in both natural and social science ushered 
in by complexity science (Pugh 2014). It 
has now become pervasive in many aca-
demic disciplines and professional practice 
(Chandler 2013, 2014a) with exponential 
growth in the number of academic papers 
published (Dunn Cavelty, Kaufmann and 
Søby Kristensen 2015). Grove (2017: 184) 
points to an ecologists’ definition, which 
refers to resilience as “a system’s capacity to 
reorganise itself in order to maintain its basic 
structure and function.” This thinking is fur-
ther supported by Adger (2000, 347), who 
argues that resilience is “the ability of groups 
or communities [such as a state] to cope 
with external stresses and disturbances as a 
result of social, political and environmental 
change.” With these definitions in mind, and 
from a reading of Chandler (2014a: 8), it is 
submitted that resilience in a security stud-
ies context refers to the ability of a state to 
maintain its core characteristics and a mini-
mum level of operational capacity in the face 
of significant security threats and incidents. 
It is added that threats include both internal 
and external threats (Bourbeau 2015).
From a synthesis of the debates in the tra-
ditional (Walt 1991), Copenhagen (Buzan 
1991b; Waever 1995) and human security 
(Alker 2005; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 
2007; Ogata and Cels 2003) schools, security 
is argued to be both “freedom from fear” and 
“freedom from want” (Booth 1999). It is sub-
mitted that there should be a level of analysis 
where the state is a referent for security and 
a level of analysis where the individual is a 
referent for security. However, the security of 
the state and that of the individual are inter-
dependent. The insecurity of the state leads 
to insecurity of the individual and vice versa. 
In this regard, this article focuses on the secu-
rity of the state, arguing that when the state 
is secure it automatically creates the condi-
tions for the security of its citizens. It is also 
submitted here that the security of the state 
is derived from its security system. In other 
words, a resilient security system guarantees 
the security of the state, which, in turn, cre-
ates the conditions for individual security.
The aim of this article, therefore, is to 
investigate Cameroon’s security system and 
security threats to ascertain whether it is 
resilient or not. Based on this background, 
this paper poses the following question: in 
the face of multiple security incidents and 
threats, is Cameroon’s security system resil-
ient? The answer to this question is pursued 
from both the complexity science and resil-
ience perspectives. If the system is found 
to be resilient, it can be concluded that 
Cameroon enjoys security and, consequently, 
creates the conditions of security for its citi-
zens. Resilience and consequent security do 
not mean the absence of perturbations from 
time to time (as at present in Cameroon). It 
means, ceteris paribus, the system should 
maintain core characteristics and a mini-
mum level of operational capacity amid a 
plethora of security challenges (Grove 2017: 
184). Security in Cameroon is not investi-
gated as a thing but as an emergent property 
of Cameroon’s security system.
This article starts with an analysis of 
Cameroon’s security system, focusing on 
its composition and behaviour. It maps the 
characteristics of the system and compares 
them with the characteristics of a CAS per 
complexity science. It is found that the char-
acteristics are overwhelmingly similar to a 
CAS. It is, therefore, submitted that security 
in Cameroon is produced by a CAS. With this 
knowledge, the central research question is 
answered from both the complexity science 
and resilience thinking perspectives.
Methodology
Cameroon is a Central African state that has 
enjoyed relative stability for most of its exist-
ence. Recently, however, Cameroon has made 
global headlines with regards to the Islamist 
group Boko Haram and secessionist vio-
lence in its two English-speaking regions (Al 
Jazeera News 2017; BBC 2015). At the time of 
writing, violence continues to escalate in the 
English-speaking regions. The issue of Boko 
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Haram in the north of Cameroon, incur-
sions from rebels from the Central African 
Republic and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea 
continue to pose serious security concerns.
The current president, Paul Biya, has been 
in power for close to 36 years, in a system 
that has dominated Cameroon for over half a 
century. In the recent presidential elections, 
an opposition candidate proclaimed himself 
the winner before the official proclamation 
of the results by the constitutional coun-
cil. The opposition argues that the election 
was marred by fraud and the 71 per cent 
attributed to President Biya is fabricated. A 
disputed election is feared to be a catalyst 
for wider crisis. Indeed, the Financial Times 
quoted an analyst from the ICG, who said 
that Cameroon is in “de facto post-election 
crisis” (Munshi 2018). The fallout of the elec-
tion continues to inspire anti-government 
protests that have led to significant injuries 
and imprisonment of many anti-government 
activists. The issues of Boko Haram (terror-
ism), the anglophone crisis (secessionist 
civil war) and anti-government protests with 
ethnic undertones (ethnic conflict) create 
critical security challenges for Cameroon.
Furthermore, Cameroon is the most popu-
lous and biggest economy in francophone 
Central Africa. It is a source of critical raw 
materials (oil and timber) for the global 
economy. As a result, Cameroon is essential 
to regional and international security. With 
active security challenges plus a long his-
tory of relative stability, Cameroon provides 
a unique opportunity to investigate security 
systems and resilience.
Given time and resources contraints, a 
Cameroon-wide survey was not feasible. A 
decision had to be made on which region of 
Cameroon is most representative. Most of 
the southwest region of Cameroon is part 
of the founding territory of Cameroon since 
the arrival of the Portuguese in the fifteenth 
century. It contains three cities that are of 
considerable significance to Cameroon. 
Limbe (formerly known as Victoria) in 
Fako Division is one of the oldest cities in 
Cameroon. As a result, Limbe has received 
settlers from other parts of Cameroon and 
beyond for more than 200 years. Limbe is 
also a beach city with a significant tourist 
population, with visitors from all parts of 
Cameroon. Cameroon’s sole petrochemi-
cal refinery (a major employer) is located in 
Limbe. The refinery brings in workers from 
all parts of Cameroon. Furthermore, the 
Cameroon Development Corporation (an 
agribusiness company), one of the biggest 
employers in Cameroon, has its headquar-
ters in Limbe.
Buea is the regional headquarters of 
the Southwest Region. It is also the for-
mer political headquarters of Cameroon 
under Germany and British Southern 
Cameroons under Britain. As a result, Buea 
also has a significant settler population 
from all parts of Cameroon. Furthermore, 
one of the most prominent universities in 
Cameroon is located in Buea. The University 
of Buea is host to a Pan African University 
Institute operated by the African Union. The 
university opens up Buea to all Cameroo-
nians. Kumba, in Meme Division bordering 
Ndian Division, is a significant cocoa produc-
tion area of Cameroon. Cocoa constitutes 
a significant export product for Cameroon, 
and Cameroonians come from far and wide 
to participate in cocoa production.
As a result of the above factors, it is argued 
that the population of the Southwest Region 
is sufficiently diverse to be representative of 
the whole of Cameroon. Consequently, the 
responses gained from end-users(residents) 
can be generalised to all of Cameroon. 
Nonetheless, there are those who will argue 
that such generalisation is problematic. 
While officially Cameroon could be divided 
into French- and English-speaking regions, in 
reality, Cameroon is made up of similar ethnic 
groups, cultures and traditions. The English-
French divide has little bearing on tradi-
tional African customs and beliefs among 
the different ethnic groups in Cameroon. 
For example, the cultural similarity between 
the Lebialem people (English-speaking) and 
the Dschang people (French-speaking) is not 
affected by French or English influences.
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In accordance with the critical approach 
in international relations and the so-called 
vernacular approach, the research for this 
article incorporated both elite and non-elite 
sources of security knowledge (Waever 1995; 
Jarvis and Lister 2012; Vaughan-Williams 
and Stevens 2016: 40; Bubandt 2005: 276). 
The research combined a questionnaire for 
security end-users (any individual who con-
sumes security), semi-structured interviews 
with security actors and a limited degree of 
documentary research. This approach was 
chosen to capture both elite and non-elite 
perspectives on security. It surveyed 407 
individuals (security end-users) and 41 semi-
structured interviews were held with security 
actors. Documents relating to the establish-
ment and regulation of security actors, such 
as chiefs, divisional officers, mayors and 
governors, were also studied. The survey was 
conducted in 2015 before the onset of the 
current civil war.
A multi-stage sampling process was used 
(Brase and Brase 2010: 15) for the question-
naire. First, the population (end-users) was 
divided into six clusters in line with the six 
administrative divisions of the Southwest 
Region. Second, simple random sampling 
was applied to select three clusters (namely 
Fako, Meme and Ndian Divisions). Finally, 
convenience sampling was used for select-
ing respondents (ibid.: 16). The question-
naire was paper, and clipboard based. It 
was administered by six research assistants 
who have experience through their work in 
a research agency. The data was later input 
into an online survey form and exported 
to SPSS.
Both public places and door-to-door visits 
were utilised to ensure wide participation. 
The survey was extended over six weeks. A 
register of respondents’ gender, age group, 
educational level and occupation was kept. 
These records enabled balanced representa-
tion of all groups. To ensure that the views 
of illiterate respondents were captured, their 
questionnaires or interviews were read or 
spoken in pidgin English. These measures 
helped to mitigate or eliminate bias.
The first question on the questionnaire 
asked respondents to list five things (in order 
of importance) that make them feel secure. 
The second questions asked for five things 
that make them feel insecure. The category 
of “secure” in the questions that asked the 
respondents to rate their security means the 
absence of the factors that made end-users 
feel insecure or the presence of the factors 
that made them feel secure. The interpreta-
tion or understanding of “secure” is deter-
mined by the end-user (the individual who 
experiences the security). Similarly, one of 
the survey questions asked the end-users to 
rate security actors. Security end-users rated 
actors based on their experience of that actor. 
The category of “good,” for example, means 
the end-user had a good experience with the 
security actor on the specific issue referred.
Cameroon’s Security Systems
When end-users were asked to indicate 
whom or what they turn to for security, the 
end-users indicated that they turned to a 
multiplicity of actors. They were also asked 
to indicate what issues were taken to which 
actor. Based on the issues listed by the end-
users as day-to-day security issues, most day-
to-day security issues were taken to a specific 
group of actors. This paper refers to this 
group of actors as the primary system.
The areas shaded white in the pie chart 
(see Figure 1) indicate the proportion of 
end-users who turn to customary security 
actors. The areas shaded grey indicate the 
percentage of end-users who turn to civil 
society actors. The areas shaded black indi-
cate the percentage of end-users who turn to 
modern state actors.
As indicated above, it was found that day-
to-day security issues were mostly referred 
to a specific group of agents. A second group 
of actors only intervene when the first set of 
actors (primary system) is overwhelmed. This 
research refers to the second group as the 
secondary system. The interviews showed 
that there is a third group of actors who are 
not interested in providing security directly 
to the end-users but are engaged in keeping 
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the security provision systems in check.1 
This research refers to the third group as 
the regulatory system. It must be noted that 
some actors are involved in more than one 
system. This paper argues that Cameroon’s 
security system is made up of three crucial 
micro/sub systems.
Primary security system
The primary system is composed of mul-
tiple agents, which include family heads, 
quarter heads, chiefs, Non-governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), tribal associations, 
witch doctors, the local police, the local 
gendarmerie and religious leaders. The func-
tion of this system is thus to provide basic 
safety, basic needs, settle disputes, socialise, 
educate, enforce and reinforce customs, and 
provide mutual support to end-users in crisis 
(end-user survey).
Secondary security system
The secondary security system deals with 
issues that the primary system lacks the 
specialisation to resolve. In other words, 
this system resolves issues that are outside 
day-to-day security needs. Most parts of this 
system are interventionist only. It was found 
that specific agents only engage in security 
provision when specific issues arise. When 
such issues are resolved, these agents disen-
gage. Some actors within the system (espe-
cially police and army actors) often have the 
word “intervention” in their name. Examples 
include the Batalion d’Intervention Rapid 
(Rapid Intervention Battalion), Brigade 
d’Intervention Rapide (Rapid Intervention 
Brigade), l’Equipe Spéciale d’Intervention 
Rapide (Special Team for Rapid Intervention) 
and Groupement Mobile d’Intervention 
(Mobile Intervention Group). These agents 
are specialised in removing “spillovers” from 
the primary system and the entire security 
system but are not engaged in day-to-day 
security provision.
The deployment of the Batalion 
d’Intervention Rapid (BIR) in the Northwest 
and Southwest Regions, the creation of a 
new Région Militaire Interarmées (RMIA5) 
in Bamenda (Northwest Region) and a new 
BIR battalion stationed in Mabanda Kumba 
(Southwest Region), is evidence of strength-
ening the secondary system for it to per-
form its role of removing entropy from the 
overarching security system. The current 
activities of these agents in the far north, the 
Figure 1: Showing the distribution of end-user preference of actors in Cameroon’s security 
architecture.
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northwest and the southwest are examples 
of this system at work.
Regulatory system
This research found that there exists within 
Cameroon security architecture a layer of 
agents whose prime responsibility is to reg-
ulate other systems. Regulation is achieved 
through education, customs, religion, beliefs, 
traditions, laws and neo-patrimonialism 
(Clapham 2001; Hansen 2003). The actors in 
these systems do not act in isolation; culture, 
pre-colonial history and tripartite colonial 
heritage shape the way actors behave in the 
regulatory systems (Hansen 2003; Mbaku 
2005). The culture where a leader is per-
ceived as a father explains how certain actors 
perform their role. The “father-son” meta-
phor exemplifies how intangible cultural 
reciprocal behaviour and mutual obligations 
shape the regulatory system.
Furthermore, the regulatory system is 
shaped and dominated by the interest of the 
presidency. The efficacy of the incumbent 
(through the regulatory system) in avoiding 
rapid change in the agents and the systems, 
is one of the most important reasons for the 
perpetuation of the incumbent. The domi-
nance of the presidency has also been dem-
onstrated by Hansen (2003).
Composition of Cameroon’s Security 
Systems
As can be seen in the pie chart in 
Figure 1, there are multiple security agents 
in Cameroon. These agents are a mixture of 
individual and organisational agents. The 
data showed that family heads, quarter heads 
or prefects are examples of individual agents. 
NGOs, Kontri2 meeting, the police and the 
army are examples of organisational agents. 
The list of agents shows significant heteroge-
neity. The interviews and survey data show 
that the agents within Cameroon’s security 
system are significantly diverse. It was shown 
that the Kontri meeting and the army, private 
security companies and witch doctors, and 
priests and the police are all agents within 
Cameroon’s security system. These agents 
have little or nothing in common.
Furthermore, security agents were drawn 
from many different sectors. These include 
the modern administrative structures, the 
modern elected structures, the traditional 
customary structures and the religious struc-
tures. The group of actors includes modern 
state actors, civil society actors, custom-
ary actors and religious actors. These have 
emerged through organic self-organisation, 
appropriation and co-optation by both the 
colonial and post-colonial governments 
(Belaun et al. 2010, 15).
The data showed that relationships or 
interactions between agents and between 
end-users and agents were codified in law, 
customs and beliefs. This laid down specific 
protocols for interaction. All relationships 
were rule-based, albeit unwritten in some 
cases. All cultures had a clearly understood 
prescription of actions in different security 
situations. For example, “if, then” rules were 
found in cases of theft: if “minor steals goat” 
then “local chief”; if “minor steals goat (twice 
or more)” then “gendarmerie.”3 These rules, 
which determine interactions, are what com-
plexity science refers to as protocols of inter-
actions. Different agents are fully aware of 
what is within their capability and what to 
pass on to other agents. A low level of refer-
rals (from agent to agent) is proof of well-
known rules followed by both the agents and 
end-users (see Figure 2 below).
From legal documents establishing gov-
ernance structures in Cameroon, the semi-
structured interviews and end-user survey, it 
was found that the organisational structure 
of Cameroon’s security architecture is hier-
archical. The presidency is at the top level of 
the hierarchy and actors such as family heads 
and quarter heads are at the lower levels of 
the hierarchy. In an ascending order, the hier-
archy is thus family head, quarter head, local 
chief, paramount chief, sub-prefect, prefect, 
governor, minister of territorial administra-
tion, with the prime minister and the presi-
dent at the top of the hierarchy.4
The data showed that customary agents, 
for example, are auxiliary to the modern 
state agents (decree no 77/245 of 15 July 
1977).5 The modern state agents rely on 
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customary agents for intelligence. The police 
and gendarmes use quarter heads to deliver 
convocations.6 Though the role of some cus-
tomary agents is derived from tradition, they 
rely on the recognition of the modern state 
to perform their duties (decree no 77/245 
of 15 July 1977).7 Since the modern state 
is absent in some parts of the territory, the 
modern state relies on the customary agents 
to perform modern state duties.8 This is evi-
dence of interdependence.
It was also found that the modern state 
elite solicits the support of locals through 
customary agents.9 The customary agents 
support and recruit locals to support the 
state. In return, the state agents recognise 
these customary agents and provide them 
with the necessary resources (salaries, con-
struction of palaces) to conduct their duties 
as auxiliaries to the state.10 The provision of 
development could be politicised in favour 
of client customary agents.11 On the issue 
of land, for example, the process is interde-
pendent as both the input of customary and 
modern state agents is required for resolu-
tion.12 Furthermore, the hierarchical struc-
ture of the security system enables agents at 
one level to depend on agents at other levels.
The existence of multiple agents who 
are interdependent, operating in different 
systems and interacting through protocols, 
means that the existence of a network is 
inevitable. It was found that many actors 
regarded certain issues to be out of their area 
of competence, thus, the necessity to pass 
things on to specialist agents. Indeed, these 
actors could name which actors specific 
issues are passed to.13 This shows that they 
were connected in a network and are aware 
that they are. Information-sharing networks 
and mutual assistance networks, such as the 
case where the police use quarter heads for 
convocation delivery and suspect identifica-
tion and arrest, are found in Cameroon.
In the exercise of their duties, agents 
within Cameroon’s security system possess 
varying degrees of autonomy. While some 
actors enjoy more autonomy than others, it 
was observed that autonomy is a characteris-
tic that is associated with many agents within 
the system. For instance, Christian religious 
leaders and NGOs enjoy a significant degree 
of autonomy. These agents are not part of the 
hierarchy of either the modern state actors 
or the customary actors (though they oper-
ate on similar levels as the customary actors).
It is argued that public opposition of the 
status quo by Christian leaders (especially 
Catholic bishops and Presbyterian Church 
leaders) demonstrates their independence 
Figure 2: Referrals from actor to actor.
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and autonomy. Such opposition is evidenced 
by the many episcopal letters critical of the 
government.14 The recent court cases brought 
against some Catholic bishops and the mod-
erator of the Presbyterian Church has been 
decried as politically motivated to intimidate 
them for being critical of the government 
(Mbunwe 2017). It is thus an attempt to curb 
their autonomy.
It was found that the presidency is the 
dominant agent. Consequently, the inter-
est of the presidency shapes the collective 
actions of agents. However, while the sys-
tem imposes parameters on the behaviour 
of agents, within their area of responsibility 
agents enjoyed local autonomy to resolve 
security issues. In other words, the presi-
dency influences the system at a macro level 
but does not necessarily direct agents at the 
micro level. This is, therefore, consistent with 
the autonomy often witnessed in a CAS.
The mere existence of a diversity of actors 
and systems within the security architecture 
of Cameroon is evidence of distributed capa-
bility. The specialisation seen where actors 
were fully aware of which issues to deal 
with and which ones to pass to other actors 
is also evidence of the redundant capacity 
discussed in complexity science literature 
(Eidelson 1997, 46). En temps normal (“in 
normal times”) day-to-day security provision 
is conducted by specific agents (the primary 
security systems). Other agents such as the 
Groupement Mobile d’Intervention (GMI) and 
specialised units of the army (the secondary 
security system) are redundant capability 
that is only drawn on in times of crisis (en 
temps de crise).
For example, when Cameroon experienced 
severe disturbances from the phenomenon of 
coupeur de route (highway bandits), it created 
a specialised unit within the army (outside of 
the primary system) to deal with this threat 
(the BIR, which now spearheads the fight 
against Boko Haram). Also, specific types of 
vigilante groups are called upon only in time 
of crisis. The government has often relied on 
vigilante groups in en temps de crise such as 
in the anglophone student crisis in Yaoundé 
in the 1990s and the current fight against 
Boko Haram (Konings 2011, 212; Moki 2015). 
These vigilante groups often disappear when 
the specific threat disappears. This creates 
redundant capacity in the system. The GMI 
and ESIR (L’Equipe Spéciale d’Intervention 
Rapide), for example, are sections of the 
police designed only to intervene, they do 
not take part in the typical day-to-day secu-
rity provision.15
Nature and Behaviour of Cameroon’s 
Security System
Anti-reductionism and non-linearity
End-users were asked to rate actors on a 
scale of 1–5 where 1 = very bad, 2 = bad, 3 = 
average, 4 = good, 5 = very good. Most end-
users rated the agents as average. Exceptions 
arose only in the case of religious leaders 
and the NGOs.16 In other words, most indi-
vidual security actors and the security they 
offer to security end-users in Cameroon is 
considered to be mediocre. However, when 
end-users were asked to rate their security 
(which is the outcome of the combination of 
interactions between these agents), 81.3 per 
cent of the end-users rated their security as 
secure or extremely secure.
In addition, when asked to rate their secu-
rity in terms of where they feel secure (at 
home, in the streets, in their town or village 
or generally), up to 84.7 per cent of the end-
users felt extremely secure in at least one of 
these places at any given time. The fact that 
the end-users are generally dissatisfied with 
individual agents providing security,17 yet 
feel secure, indicates that the whole can-
not be understood from the analysis of the 
parts. Linked to anti-reductionism, discussed 
above, is the concept of non-linearity. There is 
no linear explanation of why mediocre actors 
do not produce mediocre security. Linear 
logic suggests that average security actors 
will produce average security. The feeling 
of “extremely secure” that is observed is an 
indication of non-linearity. It was clear that 
it is impossible to understand a complex sys-
tem from the sum of the actions of its com-
ponents or reduce the system to accounts of 
the actions of individual constituents (Byrne 
1998: 15, 16).
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Co-evolution
The introduction of the French policy of 
encadrement des paysans has greatly influ-
enced leadership in Cameroon (Geschiere 
1993: 151). It has been argued that the father 
figure (defined and used in the traditional 
sense), or the chieftaincy and influences from 
the customary sector (in general), shapes 
leadership within the modern state sector 
(Hansen 2003: 210). Indeed, the president 
is often referred to as père de la nation and 
Fon of Fons (Bongmba 2006: 16–17). Modern 
state influences have also reached the cus-
tomary system by shaping the organisation 
of customary courts and the occasional refer-
ence to laws (Penal Code) by local chiefs.18
The complexity science concept of co-
evolution means the evolution of one system 
could cause evolution in another system and 
the environment. The presence of more than 
one system in Cameroon’s overarching secu-
rity system has been shown. It has also been 
demonstrated that issues arising from one 
system could affect the behaviour of other 
systems. Systems influence each other and 
their environment; in effect, the phenom-
enon of co-evolution.
Adaptive behaviour
Protocols for interactions (traditions, 
customs, religion and beliefs) significantly 
determined security in Cameroon. History 
and anthropology posit that these customs, 
beliefs, religion and traditions (through 
which individuals wish to relate or live by) 
often arise and evolve when people settle in 
a place. These customs evolve, and change, 
as the reality of settling in such a place 
are understood with time. The influences 
on this evolution include natural (climate 
change, floods, disease) as well as political 
influence (other settlers, religion, personal 
disputes, wars).
In recent history, security-providing cus-
toms survived slavery (forced migration 
of the ablest populations), settlers (freed 
slaves and missionaries), colonialism (which 
injected too many alien ideas too quickly) 
and post-colonial state building, which also 
brought ideas, practices and orders. The fact 
that these customs and customary institu-
tions still exist after many years of these 
interventions is self-evidence of their ability 
to adapt, evolve and accommodate change. 
Furthermore, the multiplicity of agents, sys-
tems and redundant capacity, means that the 
system has the ability to adapt in the face of 
varying security challenges.
In addition, adaptation has led to the 
extinction of many cultural practices that 
contradict both local and international laws. 
For instance, in some cultures, rape vic-
tims were required to marry the offender. 
However, it was found that aggravated rape 
was one of the crimes that could not be 
contained within the primary system. Such 
crimes are passed to the secondary system.19 
Adaptation and evolution are very much 
alive in Cameroon’s security system.
Emergence
Evidence has already been given showing 
that the feeling of “secure” or “extremely 
secure” recorded by the end-users cannot 
be reduced to the ratings given by the same 
end-users to the actors and security options 
represented by these actors. Security in 
Cameroon is an emergent property of 
Cameroon’s security system.
Cascading behaviour
It is argued that the grinding poverty wit-
nessed in northern Cameroon is a significant 
contributor to the recruitment of young 
people by Boko Haram.20 Desertification 
in northern Cameroon is linked to poverty. 
Perturbation such as a drought could lead 
individuals into poverty. Poverty, in turn, 
could push individuals into criminality 
(Boege et al. 2008: 315–16). In other words, 
desertification creates poverty, and poverty 
drives young people into terrorist organisa-
tions, which cause insecurity to everyone.
Furthermore, the worsening state of 
Cameroon’s economy in the 1990s is argued 
to be a causal and accelerating factor of the 
phenomenon of coupeur de route.21 Poverty 
and unemployment caused by poor eco-
nomic performance push young people to 
criminal activity as a means of survival. The 
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alleged political and economic marginalisa-
tion of the anglophones is claimed by some 
to be the cause of the current low-level civil 
war in the Northwest and Southwest regions 
of Cameroon.22
Resilience and Cameroon’s Security 
System
This section brings together all the evidence 
and arguments in the previous sections 
to answer the central research question, 
is Cameroon’s security system resilient in 
the face of multiple security incidents and 
threats? This question is answered from both 
a complexity science and resilience thinking 
perspective.
The findings above have demonstrated that 
Cameroon’s security provision is achieved 
through several systems. They have shown 
that the systems consist of multiple agents. 
These agents are diverse, autonomous and 
interdependent, are organised hierarchically 
and relate through networks controlled by 
specific protocols. The system has redun-
dant capacity, as seen in the case of the BIR 
and the GMI. With regards to the nature 
and behaviour of the system, it was found 
that Cameroon’s security system exhibits 
anti-reductionism, non-linearity, adaptive 
behaviour, emergence and cascading behav-
iour, which are core characteristics of a CAS 
(Kauffman 1996; Byrne 1998: 15, 16).
The empirical evidence from Cameroon 
is overwhelmingly consistent with the char-
acteristics of a CAS. As a result, it is argued 
that security in Cameroon is produced by 
a CAS. From a complexity science perspec-
tive, the very nature of a CAS makes it resil-
ient. In a CAS, resilience is associated with 
redundant capacity, low percolation, self-
organisation, adaptation and evolution. 
These have been demonstrated to be char-
acteristics of Cameroon’s security system. As 
a CAS, Cameroon’s security system is argued 
to be resilient.
Due to a complicated colonial heritage, 
independent Cameroon inherited boundary 
issues with its neighbour Nigeria over the 
Bakassi peninsular. This created tense rela-
tions with a military inclination. Cameroon 
succeeded in standing up to the far superior 
Nigerian army during the Bakassi disputes 
for more than 14 years.23 Furthermore, the 
successive armed groups (Bakassi Freedom 
Fighters and its splinter group Africa Marine 
Commandos), which emerged after the 
handover of Bakassi to Cameroon, have also 
been kept under control.
It is widely accepted that Cameroon has 
generally held its ground against Boko 
Haram thus far (De Marie Heungoup 2017). 
In fact, “Boko Haram has now perpetrated 
about 490 attacks and kidnappings on 
Cameroonian soil, and some 50 successful 
suicide bombings. A further 58 attempted 
suicide bombings failed” (ibid.). Unlike in 
neighbouring Nigeria, where Boko Haram 
has taken complete control of entire local 
government areas, Boko Haram has not been 
able to take and hold Cameroonian territory 
for more than a day (Blair 2015).
Cameroon’s security system has frequently 
been tested by internal security incidents. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Cameroon, with 
the help of France, defeated the Union des 
populations du Cameroun guerrillas (Weigert 
1996: 36). A coup d’état was attempted 
against Paul Biya in April 1984, orchestrated 
by the Republican Guard. The rest of the 
army fought against the Republican Guard 
for six days to restore the government.24 Biya 
is still president at the time of writing. The 
early 1990s saw protests in demand of multi-
party democracy and in 1992 there were pro-
tests against an election that was presumed 
rigged (Page, Evans and Mercer 2010: 356; 
Nkwi 2006: 95: Konnings and Nyamnjoh 
1997: 215-16). In 2008, there were several 
nationwide protests during which the armed 
forces were used.
Currently, there is a conflict between the 
armed forces and separatist groups in the 
anglophone regions of Cameroon. These 
groups claim to be fighting for an inde-
pendent state, which they call Ambazonia 
(Blomfield 2017). In places like Wabane 
Sub-Division in the Lebialem Division, most 
actors, both customary and modern state, 
are expelled by the secessionists.25 However, 
the secessionists do not form an alternative 
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to the government. Nevertheless, the con-
flict has exposed weaknesses in Cameroon’s 
security system; it is yet to be seen how 
these are resolved. It must be noted that, 
since the onset of the civil war, the govern-
ment has steadily invested in the second-
ary security system to improve its ability to 
remove entropy from the entire security sys-
tem. The effectiveness of this strategy is yet 
to be seen.
As the previous paragraphs show, in the 
face of multiple security threats, Cameroon 
has maintained the core characteristics of 
a state.26 Cameroon is still one of the few 
countries in Africa that has never experi-
enced a change of government by force. It 
has remained one of the most stable govern-
ments in Africa, with only two presidents 
since independence. Despite the threats 
and occasional crisis, since independence, 
there has never been an armed group that 
has successfully formed an alternative to 
the Cameroonian government in any part of 
the country. Cameroon continues to enjoy 
full diplomatic relations with most of the 
states in the international system. It is a 
member of the UN, the Commonwealth and 
La Francophonie, among other intergovern-
mental organisations. From a resilience per-
spective, since Cameroon has maintained its 
“core characteristics and a minimum level of 
operational capacity” for more than 50 years, 
this article submits that Cameroon’s security 
system is resilient thus far. Because of a resil-
ient security system, the state of Cameroon 
enjoys security, which creates the conditions 
of security for its citizens.
Resilience notwithstanding, unpredictabil-
ity is inherent in a CAS. Indeed, it has already 
been observed that in the case of Boko Haram 
in the north and incursions by rebels from 
the Central African Republic in the east, the 
system works as expected. However, in the 
case of the anglophone crisis, the primary 
system and certain parts of the secondary 
system (such as the police gendarmerie and 
some parts of the army) are incapacitated. 
However, the secondary system is engaged 
as expected. The consequences of this to 
the cybernetic architecture of the system is 
difficult to predict. The nature of these sys-
tems does not support an extended engage-
ment of the secondary system. An extended 
engagement may be evidence of or lead to 
system degradation. System degradation can 
lead to self-criticality or chaos (in this con-
text, system-wide war).
A CAS is a dynamic system; continuous 
adaptation is needed for a resilient system 
to stay resilient. In most cases, this adapta-
tion is achieved through self-organisation. 
However, just as the immune system occa-
sionally needs intervention (in the form of 
a vaccine or medication) to stay resilient, 
complex adaptive social systems (such as 
Cameroon’s security system) occasion-
ally need intervention to stay resilient. It is 
contended that interventions must only be 
administered at lever points with knowledge 
of the complexity of the system.
Conclusion
Thanks to complexity science and resilience 
thinking, this article has arrived at conclu-
sions about security in Cameroon that per-
haps could not be arrived at using linear 
approaches. It is submitted that Cameroon’s 
security system is resilient amidst multiple 
security incidents and threats. In this light, 
this article argues for the rejection of the 
use of terms such as fragile, failing, failed 
and hybrid political order in the analysis of 
security. Such terms and the studies that 
generate them are inadequate in the analy-
sis of security in states such as Cameroon. 
Indeed, in some cases, these terms could be 
misleading.
The complexity science approach permits 
security analysts to pursue a better under-
standing of security systems from a non-
linear, non-reductionist perspective. This 
understanding helps the recommendation 
of policy solutions that seek to enhance resil-
ience in a system that is already working. 
This is opposed to policy development from 
a linear perspective, which recommends the 
replacement of systems that are termed frag-
ile, failing or failed. The rejection of words 
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such as failed, failing or fragile, in favour of 
resilience, substantially alters the imagina-
tion of security in states such as Cameroon. 
Indeed, self-organising systems such as 
Cameroon’s security system work better 
when they experience perturbation within a 
specific limit from time to time.
This research, therefore, lays the founda-
tion for future research, which uses com-
plexity science and agent-based modelling to 
map Cameroon’s security system to quantify 
its resilience. Such a model enables the iden-
tification of possible tipping points and opti-
mal intervention points. The identification 
of the optimal intervention points is vital 
to policy formulation. A complexity science 
approach significantly enhances good policy 
development and consequently better secu-
rity outcomes for end-users.
Notes
 1 Interview with academic, University of 
Buea, July 22 2015; interview with sub-
prefect, Fako Division, 5 August 2015; 
interview with police commissioner, Fako 
Division, 4 August 2015.
 2 Otherwise known as village or tribal 
associations
 3 Interview with actors.
 4 Interview with local chief C, Fako Divison, 
10 August 2015; interview with sub-pre-
fect, Fako Division, 5 August 2015.
 5 Interview with sub-prefect, Fako Division, 
5 August 2015; interview with local chief 
B, Meme Division, 23 July 2015.
 6 Interview with police commissioner, 
Fako Division, 4 August 2015; interview 
with quarter head B, Meme Division, 25 
July 2015.
 7 Interview with sub-prefect, Fako Division, 
5 August 2015; interview with local chief 
B, Meme Division, 23 July 2015.
 8 Interview with academic, University of 
Buea, July 22 2015.
 9 Ibid.
 10 Interview with local chief C, Fako Divison, 
10 August 2015.
 11 Interview with academic, University of 
Buea, July 22 2015.
 12 Interview with local chief C, Fako Divison, 
10 August 2015; interview with sub-pre-
fect, Fako Division, 5 August 2015.
 13 Security actor interviews (multiple actors 
indicated this).
 14 Bamenda Provincial Episcopal Conference 
(BAPEC) wrote a memorandum to 
President Biya decrying alleged margin-
alisation of the English-speaking regions 
of Cameroon (BAPEC/PRES/2016/30).
 15 Interview with senior police officer, 
Yaounde, 16 February 2018.
 16 End-user survey.
 17 Most security actors were rated as aver-
age by end-users when asked to rate the 
actors they turn to for security.
 18 Interview with local chief B, Meme 
Division, 23 July 2015.
 19 Interview with local chief B, Meme 
Division, 23 July 2015; interview with 
quarter head A, Meme Division, 1 August 
2015.
 20 Interview with Cameroon intelligence 
officer, Buea, 4 January 2017.
 21 Interview with academic, University of 
Buea, July 22 2015.
 22 Interview with senior police officer, 
Yaounde, 16 February 2018.
 23 Interview with former company com-
mander, army, 28 December 2016.
 24 Ibid.
 25 Interview with local chief three, Lebialem, 
4 September 2018; interview with local 
chief one Lebialem, 4 September 2018; 
interview with local chief two, Lebialem, 
4 September 2018.
 26 The Montevideo treaty defines a state as 
an entity that has “a permanent popu-
lation, a defined territory, government 
and the capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states” (Organization 
of American States [OAS] 2017). 
International relations further argues 
that sovereignty is critically important to 
statehood (Thomson 1995).
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